OWCP v Eastern Assoc Coal Corp by unknown
1995 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-24-1995 
OWCP v Eastern Assoc Coal Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 
Recommended Citation 
"OWCP v Eastern Assoc Coal Corp" (1995). 1995 Decisions. 107. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/107 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1995 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 _____________________ 
 
 No. 94-3254 
 _____________________ 
 
 DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION  
 PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,  
 
      Petitioner  
 
 v. 
 
 EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL CORPORATION;  
 VIOLET M. O'BROCKTA; UNDERKOFFLER COAL;  
 BENJAMIN STINNER 
 _____________________ 
 
 On Appeal for Review of Orders of the Benefits 
 Review Board, United States Department of Labor 
 (BRB No. 88-2643 BLA) 
 _____________________ 
 
 Argued February 16, 1995 
 
 Before: STAPELTON and COWEN, Circuit Judges,  
   and HUYETT, District Judge* 
 
   (Filed April 24, 1995) 
 
Thomas S. Williamson, Jr., Solicitor of Labor 
Donald S. Shire, Associate Solicitor 
Christian P. Barber, Counsel for Appellate Litigation 
Dorothy L. Page, Attorney 
Edward Waldman (argued) 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Office of the Solicitor 
Suite N-2605 
Frances Perkins Building 
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20210 
 
 Counsel for Petitioner 
 Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs 
 
                     
*
  Honorable Daniel H. Huyett, 3rd, United States District Judge 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
  
Mark E. Solomons (argued) 
Laura Metcoff Klaus 
Arter & Hadden 
Suite 400K 
1801 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
 
 Counsel for Respondent 
 Eastern Associated Coal Corporation 
 
Paul K. Paterson 
Mascelli, Walsh & Paterson 
148 Adams Avenue 
Scranton, Pennsylvania 18503 
 
 Counsel for Respondent 
 Underkoffler Coal Service 
 
Andrew C. Onwudinjo 
Krasno, Krasno & Quinn 
400 North Second Street 
Pottsville Law Building 
Pottsville, PA  17901 
 
 Counsel for Respondent 
       Benjamin Stinner 
 _____________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _____________________ 
 
Huyett, District Judge: 
 The Black Lung Benefits Act ("BLBA" or "Act"), 30 
U.S.C. §§ 901-945, establishes a comprehensive scheme to 
compensate coal miners and their surviving dependents for medical 
problems and disabilities caused by pneumoconiosis, also known as 
black lung disease.  30 U.S.C. § 901(a); BethEnergy Mines, Inc. 
v. Director, OWCP, 32 F.3d 843, 845 (3d Cir. 1994).  Pursuant to 
section 422(g) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 932(g), the amount of 
benefits payable must be reduced by the amount of compensation 
  
received under a federal or state workers' compensation law 
because of death or disability caused by pneumoconiosis.   
 In the matter before us, we are presented with a 
conflict between the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs ("Director") of the Department of Labor ("DOL"), and the 
Benefits Review Board ("Board") of DOL over this offset 
provision.  Rejecting the Director's position, the Board 
determined that employers paying federal black lung benefits 
should offset their payments by the amount of state benefits the 
miners received from the Commonwealth pursuant to section 301(i) 
of the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act.  We must decide 
whether to defer to the Director's policy that compensation from 
Pennsylvania general revenues pursuant to section 301(i) of the 
Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act does not reduce the miner's 
entitlement to federal benefits.  Although we disagree with the 
Board's conclusion that Congress's intent is clear from the 
statute, we conclude that the Director's interpretation of the 
pertinent federal regulations is plainly erroneous and 
inconsistent with the regulations.  We deny the Director's 
petition for review.   
     I.  Regulatory Structure 
A.  Federal Black Lung Benefits Program 
 Prior cases have reviewed the legislative history of 
the Black Lung Benefits Act.  See, e.g., Elliot Coal Mining Co. 
v. Director, OWCP, 17 F.3d 616, 627-28 (3d Cir. 1994); Helen 
Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, 924 F.2d 1269, 1271-73 (3d Cir. 
1991).  We set forth only those portions that are essential to an 
  
understanding of this case.  Originally promulgated in 1969 as 
part of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. 
L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 792 (1969) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-
945), Congress has amended the Black Lung Benefits Act several 
times.  See, e.g., Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972); Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978); Black Lung Benefits 
Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635 (1981) (all 
codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945).  
 Claims for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act 
are either "Part B," "transition period," or "Part C" claims.  
Part B governs all claims filed before June 30, 1973.  See 30 
U.S.C. §§ 921-925.  Part B claims were filed with and adjudicated 
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Social Security 
Administration ("SSA").  Claims that were filed from July 1, 1973 
through December 31, 1973 are "transition period" claims.  30 
U.S.C. § 925.1  Congress created the transition period to 
facilitate the transfer of the primary responsibility for 
processing and adjudicating claims from the SSA to the DOL.  The 
federal treasury was responsible to pay benefits until January 1, 
1974.  30 U.S.C. § 925(a).  At that time, coal mine operators who 
had been notified of pending black lung claims were to assume 
liability for the payment of benefits.  30 U.S.C. § 925.  
  Part C, 30 U.S.C. §§ 932-945, which governs all claims 
filed after January 1, 1974, applies to the matter before us.  
                     
1
.  Technically, these claims are considered Part B claims. 
  
Although DOL administers these claims, Part C establishes an 
employer-funded federal workers' compensation program in 
cooperation with the states to provide benefits to coal mine 
workers for total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis.  A 
coal tax funded Black Lung Disability Trust Fund ("Fund") pays 
interim benefits when a designated responsible coal mine operator 
fails to commence payment within thirty days after the initial 
determination of eligibility by the deputy commissioner.  26 
U.S.C. § 9501(d)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 725.522(b).  If an 
administrative law judge, the Board, or a court later determines 
that the recipient was entitled to the amount paid from the Fund 
and that the operator was liable, the responsible operator must 
repay the Fund.  30 U.S.C. § 934(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 725.602.    
 Congress designed section 422(g) of the BLBA to prevent 
Part C claimants from receiving duplicative black lung benefits.  
Director, OWCP v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 969 F.2d 1524, 1526 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  Section 422(g) provides in pertinent part: 
  The amount of benefits payable under 
this section shall be reduced, on a monthly 
or other appropriate basis, by the amount of 
any compensation received under or pursuant 
to any Federal or State workmen's 
compensation law because of death or 
disability due to pneumoconiosis. 
30 U.S.C. § 932(g).  A provision is also designed to prevent 
double recovery in Part B claims.  Although not directly 
applicable to the matter before us, it is useful to compare it 
with section 422(g).  Section 412(b) reads in pertinent part: 
 [B]enefit payments under this section to a 
miner, or his widow, child, parent, brother, 
or sister shall be reduced, on a monthly or 
  
other appropriate basis, by an amount equal 
to any payment received by such miner or his 
widow, child, parent, brother, or sister 
under the workmen's compensation, 
unemployment compensation, or disability 
insurance laws of his State on account of the 
disability of such miner due to 
pneumoconiosis, and the amount by which such 
payments would be reduced on account of 
excess earnings of such miner under section 
203(b) through (l) of the Social Security 
Act, if the amount paid were a benefit 
payable under section 202 of such Act. 
30 U.S.C. § 922(a). 
B.  Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act 
 In the two cases consolidated before the Board, miners 
George O'Brockta and Benjamin Stinner both received benefits 
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act, 77 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1201-1603, because of pneumoconiosis.  
Section 301(i) of the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act, 
states in pertinent part as follows: 
 Notwithstanding any other provisions of this 
act, compensation for silicosis, anthraco-
silicosis, coal worker's pneumoconiosis, and 
asbestosis shall be paid for each month 
beginning with the month this amending act 
becomes effective, or beginning with the 
first month of disability, whichever occurs 
later, at the rate of seventy-five dollars 
($75) per month, to every employe totally 
disabled thereby as a result of exposure 
thereto, who has not theretofore been 
compensated because his claim was barred by 
any of the time limitations prescribed by 
this act, and shall continue during the 
period of such total disability.     
77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1401(i).  
The source of the compensation depends on the miner's situation.  
Generally, Pennsylvania pays forty percent of the liability 
  
imposed under the Occupational Disease Act and a responsible 
employer pays sixty percent.  77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1408(a).  
The Commonwealth, however, pays all compensation if it is not 
conclusively proven that the miner's disability arose out of 
employment with his last employer, 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
1401(g), or if a miner's last exposure preceded December 1, 1965, 
77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1401(i).  When a claimant receives 
benefits pursuant to the federal statute, Pennsylvania law 
requires the state to suspend compensation from the general 
revenues of the Commonwealth.2  77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
1401(k).    
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.  The pertinent part of the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease 
Act reads as follows: 
  Upon the award of any benefits under the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 to a person who 
is also receiving or claiming monthly compensation 
totally funded by general revenues of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania under subsections (a), (i), (j) or (l) 
of section 301, such person shall have his monthly 
compensation from general revenues of the Commonwealth 
suspended effective with the month following the month 
of award of Federal benefits . . . .  Upon any future 
action by the United States Congress, Federal executive 
departments, or Federal courts which would make present 
recipients under the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease 
Act eligible for both Federal and State payments, the 
sum of which would exceed the maximum authorized 
Federal payment, the eligible recipients would then 
receive retroactively all State payments that were 
suspended under the authority of this act.  All such 
recipients who have their State payments suspended 
shall continue their eligibility and entitlement under 
the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act and at any 
time in the future for whatever reason that such 
recipients' payments under the Federal law are 
terminated, suspended or reduced their State payments 
shall be reinstituted effective with the month 
following the month that Federal benefits are 
terminated, suspended or reduced.  
  
 
 II.  Facts and Procedural History 
 We review two cases consolidated before the Benefits 
Review Board on appeal.  George O'Brockta ("O'Brockta") filed an 
application for federal black lung benefits on December 2, 1976.  
See J.A. at 64 (ALJ Decision and Order - Award of Benefits, Dec. 
9, 1983).  Respondent Eastern Associated Coal Corporation 
("Eastern") controverted its designation as responsible operator, 
and the DOL initiated the payment of interim benefits from the 
Fund.  While this application was pending, a Pennsylvania Bureau 
of Workers' Compensation Referee directed the Pennsylvania 
Department of Labor and Industry to compensate O'Brockta at the 
rate of $125.00 per month beginning July 9, 1979, pursuant to 
section 301(i) of the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act.  
J.A. at 73-74 (Referee's Decision, Jan. 11, 1980).  O'Brockta 
eventually collected $1,750.00 from Pennsylvania for the period 
July 9, 1979 to September 23, 1980.  Pursuant to a West Virginia 
occupational disease act, he collected $10,756.73 for the period 
November 21, 1976 to June 4, 1978.   
 O'Brockta's widow later filed a survivor's claim on 
September 24, 1980.  An administrative law judge ordered Eastern 
to pay Mrs. O'Brockta for benefits to which she was entitled 
commencing in December 1976.  J.A. at 54 (Decision and Order -- 
Awarding Benefits, Feb. 25, 1986).  On a motion for 
reconsideration, the administrative law judge ordered Eastern to 
(..continued) 
77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1401(k). 
  
"reimburse the Secretary of Labor for any payments made to the 
claimant less the appropriate offsets for state workmen's 
compensation benefits" and to deduct such amounts, as 
appropriate, from the amounts it was required to pay Mrs. 
O'Brockta.  J.A. at 51-53 (Order Granting Employer's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Amending the Decision and Order Awarding 
Benefits, April 3, 1986).  The administrative law judge 
considering the Director's Motion for Reconsideration rejected 
the Director's argument that although the award properly offset 
payments made pursuant to the West Virginia statute, payments 
derived from Pennsylvania general revenues were not pursuant to a 
workers' compensation law.  J.A. at 46-49 (Order Denying Motion 
for Clarification, May 19, 1988). 
 Benjamin Stinner ("Stinner") filed his claim for 
benefits pursuant to section 301(i) of the Pennsylvania 
Occupational Disease Act on September 27, 1978.  On October 4, 
1979, a state referee directed the Pennsylvania Department of 
Labor and Industry to pay him $125 per month commencing August 3, 
1979.  J.A. at 76-78 (Referee's Decision, Oct. 4, 1979).  He 
eventually received $2000 pursuant to this program.  He 
subsequently filed for benefits pursuant to the BLBA on January 
9, 1980.  After designated responsible operator Underkoffler Coal 
Service ("Underkoffler") refused to pay benefits to Stinner, DOL 
initiated interim payments from the Fund on April 8, 1981.  On 
December 9, 1983, pursuant to the BLBA, an administrative law 
judge ordered benefits to commence as of January 1980.  J.A. at 
64-72 (Decision and Order - Award of Benefits, Dec. 9, 1983).  
  
Underkoffler repaid the Department of Labor for the interim 
benefits except $2000, the amount of benefits Stinner received 
pursuant to the Pennsylvania program.  The administrative law 
judge considering this issue refused to order Underkoffler to 
repay this money.  J.A. at 39-42 (Decision and Order - Denying 
Additional Reimbursement of Medical Benefits, June 27, 1988).  
These two cases were consolidated for appeal to the Board.      
 On appeal, the Board rejected the Director's contention 
that payments made to O'Brockta and Stinner pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act did not reduce the amount 
of federal benefits that responsible operators must reimburse the 
Fund.  The Board found the statutory language of section 422(g) 
clear and unambiguous, and it refused to consider the legislative 
history as an aid to its construction of the statute.  J.A. at 
17-25 (Decision and Order of the Benefits Review Board, March 22, 
1994).      
 The Director now petitions for review.  We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the final order of the 
Benefits Review Board pursuant to section 422(a) of the Black 
Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 932(a), which incorporates section 
21(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 921(c).3   
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.  The Supreme Court recently considered the Director's standing 
to pursue appeals in Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding 
& Dry Dock Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ____, ___ L. Ed.2d ___, 
No. 93-1783, 1995 WL 115726 (March 21, 1995).  The Supreme Court 
held that the Director does not have standing to sue pursuant to 
§ 921(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 
33 U.S.C. § 921(c), to seek judicial review of decisions by the 
Benefits Review Board that in the Director's view, deny claimants 
  
 III.  Discussion 
 A.  Standard of Review  
 When we review the decisions of the Board for error of 
law, our review is plenary.  Director, OWCP v. Barnes & Tucker 
Co., 969 F.2d 1524, 1527 (3d Cir. 1992); Hillibush v. United 
States Dep't of Labor, Benefits Review Bd., 853 F.2d 197, 202 (3d 
Cir. 1988).  The principals of deference articulated in Chevron, 
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
104 S. Ct. 2278, 81 L. Ed.2d 694 (1984), however, guide our 
construction of the BLBA.  See also Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. 
Director, OWCP, 17 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1994).    
 When we review an agency's construction of a statute, 
if the intent of Congress is clear, we must give effect to that 
intent.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82.  If 
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a particular 
issue, then we must defer to the agency's regulation if it is 
based on a reasonable construction of the statute.  Id.  When 
(..continued) 
compensation to which they are entitled.  This decision does not 
affect this appeal, however, because Congress explicitly 
designated the Secretary of Labor as a party in any proceeding 
relative to a claim for black lung benefits.  30 U.S.C. § 932(k).  
See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  Furthermore, the Board 
decision adversely affected DOL's ability to recover payments 
from the Fund and thus implicates the Director's pecuniary 
interest, making him an aggrieved party under the teachings of 
Krolick Contracting Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 558 F.2d 685, 
689 (3d Cir. 1977), and its progeny.  See Director, OWCP v. 
Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 678 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1982); 
accord Director, OWCP v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 560 F.2d 710, 
716-17 (5th Cir. 1977); cf. Newport News Shipbuilding, 1995 WL 
115726 at *2 n.1 (noting that the issue of the Director's 
standing as administrator of a LHWCA Fund was not before the 
court). 
  
considering whether the regulation complies with Congress's 
mandate:     
 [W]e look to see whether the regulation 
harmonizes with the plain language of the 
statute, its origin, and its purpose. . . .  
So long as the regulation bears a fair 
relationship to the language of the statute, 
reflects the views of those who sought its 
enactment, and matches the purpose they 
articulated, it will merit deference. 
Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 We must also "defer to an agency's consistent 
interpretation of its own regulation unless it is 'plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'"  Director, OWCP 
v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1323 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Bowles 
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S. Ct. 1215, 
1217, 89 L. Ed. 1700 (1945)); Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d at 453.  We 
accord greater deference to an administrative agency's 
interpretation of its own regulations than to its interpretation 
of a statute.  Facciano Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of 
Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
114 S. Ct. 80, 126 L. Ed.2d 48 (1993).  See also Martin v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150, 
111 S. Ct. 1171, 1175, 113 L. Ed.2d 117 (1991); Lyng v. Payne, 
476 U.S. 926, 939, 106 S. Ct. 2333, 2341, 90 L. Ed.2d 921 (1986) 
("an agency's construction of its own regulations is entitled to 
substantial deference").  This deference, however, does not 
permit us to defer to an "interpretation in an adversary 
proceeding that strains the plain and natural meaning of the 
words."  Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health 
  
Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1978); Mangifest, 826 
F.2d at 1324.  As we have said before: 
 The responsibility to promulgate clear and 
unambiguous standards is upon the Secretary.  
The test is not what he might possibly have 
intended, but what he said.  If the language 
is faulty, the Secretary has the means and 
the obligation to amend.  
Bethlehem Steel v. OSHRC, 573 F.2d at 161.  Thus, any deference 
also is "tempered by our duty to independently insure that the 
agency's interpretation comports with the language it has 
adopted."  Director, OWCP v. Gardner, 882 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 
1989).  See also Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d at 453; Barnes & Tucker 
Co., 969 F.2d at 1527.   
 In addition, we give judicial deference to the 
Director, as policymaker, rather than to the Board, which is 
purely an adjudicator.  Elliot Coal Mining Co., 17 F.3d at 626-
27; Barnes & Tucker Co., 969 F.2d at 1527; Gardner, 883 F.2d at 
70.  When the Director and the Secretary advance conflicting 
interpretations of the statute, the Secretary's interpretation 
prevails over the Director's because the Director is a mere 
delegatee of the Secretary.  Elliot Coal Mining Co., 17 F.3d at 
627.  As a result, when a regulation is clear on its face, the 
regulation may not be subject to an alternative construction by 
the Director.  Gardner, 882 F.2d at 68.   
B.  Interpretation of the Regulations    
 We agree with the Director that the statute is 
ambiguous.  The statute requires an offset "by the amount of any 
compensation received under or pursuant to any Federal or State 
  
workmen's compensation law because of death or disability due to 
pneumoconiosis."  30 U.S.C. § 932(g).  Congress's intent as to 
the meaning of "workers' compensation law" is not clear from the 
text of the statute alone.  The statute fails to define the 
meaning of worker's compensation, nor is its meaning apparent 
from the text.  As did the Board, we consider the definition of 
"workmen's compensation" as provided in Larson's Workmen's 
Compensation.  It defines workmen's compensation as follows:   
 Workmen's compensation is a mechanism 
providing cash-wage benefits and medical care 
to victims of work-connected injuries, and 
for placing the cost of these injuries 
ultimately on the consumer, through the 
medium of insurance, whose premiums are 
passed on in the cost of the product. 
1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 1.00 
(1994).   The Director points out that in certain situations, 
section 301(i) of the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act 
places the cost on the public fisc, rather than by using 
insurance, and that the amount of the Pennsylvania payments bear 
no relation to the miner's wages.  We agree that the text of the 
statute is ambiguous with respect to whether section 301(i) of 
the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act was excluded from the 
term "workman's compensation laws."  Therefore, the Board erred 
in concluding that the text was clear, and we must consider 
whether the Secretary's regulation and the Director's 
interpretation comport with the statute.  
 We consider two regulations.  The regulation 
implementing section 422(g) states as follows: 
  
 With respect to any benefits payable for all 
periods of eligibility after January 1, 1974, 
a reduction of the amount of benefits payable 
shall be required on account of:   
  (1)  Any compensation or benefits 
received under any State workers' 
compensation law because of death or partial 
or total disability due to pneumoconiosis . . 
. . 
20 C.F.R. § 725.533(a)(1).  The regulations define a "workers' 
compensation law" for the purposes of Part C as follows:  
 For the purposes of this subchapter, except 
where the content clearly indicates 
otherwise, the following definitions apply: . 
. . (4) A "workers' compensation law" means a 
law providing for payment of benefits to 
employees, and their dependents and 
survivors, for disability on account of 
injury, including occupational disease, or 
death, suffered in connection with their 
employment.   
20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(4) (emphasis added).  These regulations 
comport with the language of the statute and with Congress's 
apparent intent.  The regulations fail to suggest that when a law 
authorizes benefits to employees solely from general revenues, it 
is not a workers' compensation statute.  In fact, the text of the 
regulation does not suggest that the source of funding of the law 
plays any role in its determination as a workers' compensation 
law. 
 The Director, however, argues that we should defer to 
her interpretation that the phrase "payment of benefits to 
employees" actually means "payment of benefits by employers to 
employees."  She offers several reasons for her interpretation of 
the regulation.  First, a now repealed regulation defined 
  
"workers' compensation law" exactly as the Director seeks to 
interpret the current regulation.  The Director argues that prior 
to 1978, Part C regulations defined "workmen's compensation law" 
as follows: 
 A "workmen's compensation law" means a law 
providing for payment of compensation by 
employers to employees (and their dependents) 
for injury (including occupational disease), 
or death suffered in connection with their 
employment.   
20 C.F.R. § 715.101(a)(18) (1977) (repealed) (emphasis added).  
The Director argues that Congress never amended the statute to 
change the definition of "workers' compensation law" and that 
there is no record that the Director intended to change her 
policy of not reducing federal black lung benefits by the amount 
of compensation received solely from Pennsylvania general 
revenues under section 301(i).  The issue however, is what the 
Secretary said through regulation, not what the Secretary might 
have intended.  Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 573 F.2d 157, 161 
(3d Cir. 1978).  Thus, if anything, this older regulation 
provides further proof that the current regulations do not 
exclude laws that provide for payments from a state's general 
revenues from the definition of "workers' compensation laws."  
Regulations in Part B provide further support that the Director's 
interpretation of the regulations is inconsistent with the text 
of the regulation.  Part B regulations explicitly define 
"workmen's compensation law" to exclude statutes funded by 
general revenues.  Section 410.110(p) provides as follows:   
  A "workmen's compensation law" means a 
law providing for payment of compensation to 
  
an employee (and his dependents) for injury 
(including occupational disease) or death 
suffered in connection with his employment.  
A payment funded wholly out of general 
revenues and paid (without regard to 
insurance principles) solely on account of 
the financial need of the miner and his 
family, shall not be considered a payment 
under a "workmen's compensation law." 
20 C.F.R. § 410.110(p) (emphasis added).  Although the Director 
argues that DOL looked to the SSA's interpretation of the BLBA in 
writing the regulations, the SSA regulations are much different 
than the DOL regulations.  This regulation reinforces the 
impression that the Director must comply with the text of the 
regulation rather than with what the Secretary may have intended 
section 725.101(a)(4) to mean.  
 Second, the Director argues that if the words "to 
employees" are read without inferring the words "by employers" 
the word "to employees" loses its specific meaning and the more 
general word "individuals" could be substituted instead.  
Director's Br. at 29.  This interpretation in not evident from 
the text of the regulation.  The BLBA only provides benefits to 
injured employees and their dependents.  Some other "individual" 
who receives compensation pursuant to some state statute, would 
never be seeking benefits pursuant to the BLBA.  The Director's 
interpretation adds words that are not in the text and are not 
evident from a plain and natural reading of the statute.       
 Third, the Director argues that the Board's decision 
confers a windfall on the employers.  We agree with the Director 
that pursuant to the Board's decision, the Respondents' total 
  
liability is less than it would have been had there been no state 
award.  This policy concern, however, is one the Secretary must 
address through rewriting the regulations rather than through 
interpretation.     
 Finally, the Director argues that the "the Black Lung 
Benefits Act is remedial legislation that ought to be liberally 
construed, so long as such a construction would not be plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the language of the Act."  
Director's Br. at 31.  While the Director's interpretation is not 
inconsistent with the statute, it is inconsistent with the 
statute's implementing regulations, even according substantial 
deference to the Director.  Therefore, we cannot defer to this 
interpretation.   
  Although the Director claims that she consistently has 
applied the same policy for twenty years, she is not permitted to 
imply language that simply does not exist.  Director, OWCP v. 
Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1324 (3d Cir. 1987).  Absent from the 
text of the regulation is any suggestion that the funding source 
of a state statute determines its status as a workers' 
compensation statute.  Her interpretation strains the "plain and 
natural meaning" of the text.  To reach such a result would 
require consideration of factors far beyond the actual 
regulation.  
 On the other hand, we also reject the Board's argument 
that we must accord deference to Pennsylvania's interpretation of 
section 422(g) of the BLBA.  We defer only to the interpretations 
offered by the agency charged with administering the law.  Thus, 
  
the fact that section 301 of the Pennsylvania Occupational 
Disease Act is in Title 77, entitled "Workmen's Compensation," 
does not influence our decision, nor does the fact that the 
referee who awarded O'Brockta and Stinner benefits was a 
Workmen's Compensation Referee for the Commonwealth's Bureau of 
Workers' Compensation.  To hold otherwise would permit the state, 
rather than the federal government to administer the laws.  Thus, 
we must reject the Board's reasoning that the plain meaning of 
section 422(g) is that when a state has denominated a law as a 
workers' compensation law, benefits paid pursuant to it are 
subject to offset.  We reiterate that we cannot accord more 
deference to the Director's interpretation of the regulation than 
to the actual regulation. 
 The Director points to a single segment of the 
legislative history that support her interpretation, but we find 
her reference unhelpful.4  Congress delegated the Secretary the 
                     
4
.  During floor debate in 1969, Representative Dent, congressman 
from Pennsylvania who was the floor manager of the Bill, stated 
that the offset provisions of §§ 412(b) and 422(g) did not apply 
to state programs funded through general revenues.  He cited the 
Pennsylvania program that paid benefits out of general revenues 
as an example of a program that was not a "workmen's 
compensation" program within the meaning of the Act.  115 Cong. 
Rec. 39713 (1969).  This isolated floor comment would have 
provided some support for the Director's position had the 
Secretary interpreted the provisions of the Act relating to Part 
C in the same manner as the Social Security Administration 
interpreted the provisions relating to Part B when it promulgated 
§ 410.110(p) of its regulations.  However, the Secretary, whom we 
believe from the context must have been acting advertently, 
adopted a regulation regarding Part C claims with a text markedly 
different from the text of § 410.110(p).  Congressman Dent's 
comment would not justify our reading the Secretary's regulation 
concerning Part C claims in a manner inconsistent with its text. 
  
responsibility to fill in the gaps left in the BLBA.  If DOL 
intends to make an exception for state statutes that are funded 
solely through a state's general revenues, it has the means and 
obligation to amend its regulations to provide for this 
exception.  The Director's interpretation does not comport with 
the language of the regulations.   
 
 IV. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, we hold that the agency's regulations 
defining workmen's or workers' compensation laws are a reasonable 
construction of the statute, the regulations are not ambiguous, 
and the Director's interpretation of the regulations are 
inconsistent with the regulation, therefore, we do not defer to 
the Director's interpretation.  Although we disagree with the 
Board that Congress's intent is plain from the statutory 
language, we hold that because the Director's interpretation of 
the regulations are inconsistent with the Secretary's 
regulations, the Board's order should be affirmed.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for 
review and affirm the order of the Benefits Review Board.  
